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NOTES AND COMMENTS
Administrative Law-Unreasonable Search and SeizureCompelled Production of Tax Records
Congress, as an incident' to the exercise of its power to "lay and
collect taxes on income,"'2 has granted to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue authority to summon witnesses, examine and compel production of tax records. Upon failure of the taxpayer or witness to appear
or to produce books, papers, records and memoranda, the district court
may order an examination or issue a subpoena duces tecum compelling
compliances with the demands of the Commissioner.
There is the utmost need for such investigatory powers in order to
avoid reducing the collection of income taxes to a voluntary basis. Yet,
in the ordinary exercise of these important powers of inquiry into tax
matters it is inevitable that the information elicited at times will assume
a scope and nature which contravene the principles of the Fourth 4 and
Fifth Amendments. 5 Although a subpoena duces tecum lacks many of
the aggravating incidents of an actual search and seizure, it contains
many of the same features and accomplishes substantially the same
purpose. Boyd v. United States6 held that compelling one to produce
his private papers which incriminate him7 was an unreasonable search
and seizure. The rationale of the Boyd case was affirmed and extended
'U. S. CoNsT. Art. I § 8: "The Congress shall have power to make all Laws
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing
Powers and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of
the United States, or any Department or Officer thereof."
'U. S. Cowsr. AmEND. XVI.
'The Constitutional validity of authorizing the courts to use their process

in aid of inquiries before administrative agencies has been firmly established.
Such a provision does not confer non-judicial -powers on the courts but is a case
or controversy to which the judicial power of the United States extends. Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U. S. 447 (1894).
' "The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be violated. . .
a"... nor shall any person . .. be compelled in any criminal case to
be a
witness against himself. ..

."

116 U. S. 616,622,624 (1886): "A compulsory production of a man's papers
to establish a criminal charge against him or to forfeit his property is within
the scope of the Fourth Amendment to the Constitution in all cases in which a
search and seizure would be..

..

"... and we are further of opinion that a compulsory production of the private
books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such suit is
compelling him to be a witness against himself within the meaning of the Fifth
Amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of . . . an unreasonable
search and seizure within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment."
'Use of the Fourth Amendment in aid of the Fifth has led to severe criticism
of the Boyd case. Eg. see 8 WIGuORE, EVIDENCE §2264 p. 363 (3d ed. 1940).
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in Hale v. HenkelS which declared that a subpoena duces tecum may
constitute an unreasonable search because of the broad sweep and indefiniteness of its demands. There can be little doubt that these objections
will continue to be raised at least so long as tax books and records are
construed by the courts as having the status of "private papers."
The question of whether tax books and records are to be considered
private or public papers has been highlighted by Shapiro v. United
States.9 This decision, if extended by the courts, will have far reaching
effect on the administration of internal revenue laws. Defendant,
Shapiro, was tried on charges of having made tie-in sales in violation
of the regulations under the Emergency Price Control Act. Having
previously been compelled by subpoena duces tecum to produce his
sales records and having raised timely objection, defendant made a plea
in bar claiming immunity from prosecution based on Section 202(g)
of the Act.' 0
The majority-" held that the immunity provision was intended as a
substitute or compensation for what would otherwise have been the
constitutional privilege of the witness ;12 hence where no constitutional
8201 U. S. 43 (1903).
335 U. S. 1 (1948).
"No person shall be excused from complying with any requirements under
this section because of his privilege against self-incrimination, but the immunity
provisions of the Compulsory Testimony Act of February 11, 1893 ... shall apply
with respect to any individual who specifically claims such privilege."
The Compulsory Testimony Act of 1893 provides: "No person shall be excused
from attending and testifying or from producing 'books, papers . . . before the
Interstate Commerce Commission or in obedience to the subpoena of the Commission . . . on the ground or for the reason that the testimony or evidence,
documentary or otherwise, required of him, may tend to criminate him ...
But no person shall be prosecuted ... for or on account of any transaction, matter
or thing, concerning which he may testify, or produce evidence, documentary
or otherwise, before said Commission or in obedience to its subpoena ....
11 The decision was five to four with three dissenting opinions. The majority
based its decision on Heike v. United States, 227 U. S. 131 (1913) and Wilson
v. United States, 221 U. S. 361 (1911). The former held that the provisions of
immunity statutes have no application to the production of documents where no
constitutional privilege exists. The latter held that the constitutional privilege,
which exists as to private papers may not be validly asserted as to corporate
records required by law.
Since the Wilson case it can be said generally that corporate records are
"public" and amenable to process if operations are carried on in areas appropriately subject to government regulation. This view however, does not cut down
the scope of the Fifth Amendment because the constitutional privilege against
self-incrimination is a personal one, applying only to natural persons. It cannot
therefore be utilized by or on behalf of a corporation. United States v. White,
322 U. S. 694, 699 (1944).
1 The Court quoted from Holmes, J. in the Heike case: "...
the obvious
purpose of the statute is to make evidence available and compulsory that otherwise could not be got. We see no reason for supposing that the Act offered a
gratuity to crime. It should be construed, so far as its words fairly allow the
construction, as coterminous with what otherwise would have been the privilege
of the person concerned." 335 U. S. 1, 19 (1943). See also Councilman v. Hitchcock, 142 U. S. 547 (1891).
0

1951]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

privilege existed, no immunity could be granted. 13 Prosecution and conviction of defendant was upheld because he had no constitutional privilege against self-incrimination in the sales records since they were "required by law to be kept"' 4 and had "public aspects."'' 5
That the required records doctrine, if extended, will have applicability to tax matters 16 is evidenced by the Codei 7 and Regulations' s
which require records to be kept. 19 Although the Shapiro case was concerned mainly with the Fifth Amendment (self-incrimination), to which
the scope of this writing extends only incidentally,20 it is obvious that if
records required by law to be kept are construed as being so "public"
in nature that the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination is
inapplicable, 2 1 then such construction would eliminate unreasonable
"Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 20 (1948).
§14 of Maximum Price Regulation 426, 8 FED. REG. 9546, 9548-49(1943)
provides: "Records. (a) Every person subject to this regulation shall . . .preserve for examination by the Office of Price Administration all his records ...
or other written evidences of sale or delivery which relate to the prices charged
pursuant to the provisions of this regulation ...shall keep and make available for
examination . . . records of the same kind which he customarily kept, relating
to prices ... "
' ".

. . it cannot be doubted that -the sales record which petitioner was

required to keep as a licensee under the Price Control Act has 'public aspects.'"
Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 34 (1948).
" Mr. Justice Frankfurter raises this possibility in his dissenting opinion.
335 U.
S. 1, 54 (1948).
7
1NT.
I
Rav. ConE §54(a).
8
' U. S. Treas. Reg. 111 §29.54-1 (as amended by T. D. 5381, 1944 Cum. BuL.
188). "Every person subject to the tax . .. shall, for the purpose of enabling
the Commissioner to determine the correct amount of income subject to tax,
keep such permanent books of account or records, including inventories, as are sufficient to establish the amount of the gross income and the deductions, credits and
other matters required to be shown in any return.... The books or records required by this section shall be kept at all times available for inspection by internal
revenue officers and shall be retained so long as the contents thereof may become
material in the administration of any internal revenue law." Cf. §14 of. Maximum
Price Regulation 426 quoted in part in note 14 supra which is the basis of the
decision
in the Shapiro case.
'0 See 27 TAXES 639 (1949).
.0Generally on quasi-public records and self-incrimination, see Note, 47 CoL.
L. REv. 838 (1947). Also Note, 24 Ind. L. J.567 (1949), 8 WIGmORE, EVIDENCE
§2259c (3d ed. 1940) (See list of cases cited in 1949 Pocket Supplement in particular).
2XWhether the privilege against self-incrimination actually exists as to the
production of an individual's tax records has not been authoritatively decided. Indeed, there is a striking scarcity of cases squarely on the point. See Internal
Revenue Agent v. Sullivan, 287 Fed. 138 D.C. N.Y. (1923). Also United States
v. Murdock, 284 U. S. 141 (1931). As a practical matter, if such privilege exists,
it would seem wise that Congress enact an immunity provision similar to that
accompanying virtually all the major regulatory statutes. For a list of enactments
containing such immunity clause, see Shapiro v. United States, 335 U. S. 1, 6
(1948). The Bureau is primarily in the business of collecting taxes, not of
punishing criminals and its task at best is a most difficult one without the added
complication of a constitutional privilege to hinder its enforcement of the revenue
laws. An immunity provision gets evidence to aid tax collection and amnesty is
granted for offenses which in many instances are- not provable anyway.
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search and seizure22 as a defense to a subpoena duces tecum compelling
production of those records. Especially is this true since a demand
of records so public would clearly be a reasonable search. If taxpayers'
records are by judicial interpretation made "public" it may be that
government officials charged with administering the revenue laws will
have an inherent power to examine those records whether relevant to
any matter under investigation or not. Until such characterization is
made, however, the cry of "fishing expedition" will continue to be raised
and extensive analysis of the statutes will be necessary to ascertain the
scope of the inquisitorial powers granted.
Are the present Code provisions susceptible of an interpretation
which permits an unreasonable search and seizure? The Commissioner,
after refusal of a taxpayer or third party to comply with his demands,
may petition 2 3 the district court 24 to order an examination or compel
production of books of account. The investigation must be for the
purpose of "ascertaining the correctness of a return" or "making a return where none has been made." 2 5 Further, the petition must identify
22 Mr. Justice Frankfurter poses the question of whether the majority holding
does not in fact make a man's home a "public library." In pointing out the extreme consequences to which the decision may lead, he says: "Moreover, the
Government should be able to enter a man's home to examine or seize such public
records, with or without a search warrant, at any time." Shapiro v. United
States, 335 U. S. 1, 54, 55 (1948). It may be urged that such conclusion does not
necessarily follow. Even though the word "papers," as used in the Fourth Amendment (see note 4 .tpra) means "private papers" there is still the "right of
the people to be secure in their houses." The sanctity of a man's home would
require the use of appropriate and orderly process to get access to those records.
A subpoena duces tecum is one such appropriate process. But see Davis v.
United States. 328 U. S.582 (1946).
2 "Petition" is in form a complaint and is governed by Rule 8(a) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128
F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942).
2 INT. REv. CoDE §3633(a) : "If any person is summoned under the internal
revenue laws to appear, to testify, or to produce books, papers, or other data,
the district court of the United States for the district in which such person
resides shall have jurisdiction by appropriate process to compel such attendance,
testimony, or production of books, papers, or other data."
INT. REV. CODE §3615(e) : "Whenever any person summoned under this section
neglects or refuses to obey such summons, or to give testimony or to answer interrogatories as required, the collector may apply to the judge of the district court
• . .for an attachment against him as for contempt."
See It re Wolrich, 84 F. Supp. 481 (D.C. N.Y. 1949).
"INTq. REv. CoDE §3614 (a) : "The Commissioner, for the purpose of ascertaining the correctness of any return or for the purpose of making a return
where none has been made, is authorized, by any officer . .. designated by him
for that purpose, to examine any books, papers, records or memoranda bearing
tipon the matters required to be included in the return, and may require the
attendance of the person rendering the return ...or the attendance of any other
person having knowledge in the premises, and may take his testimony with
reference to the matter required by law to be included in such return. . ."
Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 33 F. Supp. 478 (S.D. Cal. 1940) aff'd. 128 F. 2d
731 (9th Cir. 1942). McDonough v. Lambert, 94 F. 2d 838 (5th Cir. 1938). See S
MERTEN, LAW OF FEDERAL INcOmE TAXATON §47.44 et seq. (ed. 1943).
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the books, papers, and records with reasonable particularity 26 as having
a "bearing upon matters required to be included in the return" 2 7 or as
"respecting any objects or income liable to tax or the returns thereof." 28
Since the statute clearly limits the investigatory power to matters bearing on the income tax liability of a taxpayer and the provisions are so
defined and limited to this legitimate purpose, there can be no basis for
an interpretation so broad as to permit an unreasonable search and
seizure. If the records demanded are not reasonably identified as bearing on the tax liability of the person whose return is being investigated,
the statute is not complied with and the subpoena is unenforceable, not
because it imports an unreasonable search but because it is beyond the
pale of the statutory grant. 29 The provisions of the quoted statutes are
the measure of the Commissioner's power and an investigatory proceeding which does not comply with the requirements therein, is a wholly
unauthorized assumption of inquisitorial powers.30 Hence, to hold that
a subpoena duces tecum or an examination is a "fishing expedition ' 31
and thus an unreasonable search and seizure prohibited by the Fourth
Amendment is to violate one of the cardinal rules of constitutional
decision.3 2
A much more difficult question arises in ascertaining what is a
"reasonable" time during which books of account may be examined or
their production compelled. After the passage of a reasonable time it
may be argued with force that any search would constitute an unreasonable search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. There is no
express statutory time limitation on examination and production of
2 First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F2d 532, 535 (5th Cir. 1947). See
also United States v. Union Trust Co., 13 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa. 1936).
2

INT. REv.
INT.

CODE

§3614(a), quoted supra note 25.

REv. CODE §3615(a).

"Under this view a corporation is entitled to protection by the courts against
a broad search, quite apart from the question of whether a corporation may be
protected by the Fourth Amendment itself. There are cases which indicate that
the prohibition against unreasonable search and seizure applies to corporations as
well as individuals. E.g. see Hale v. Henkel, 281 U. S.43, 76(1906).
A measure which gave the Commissioner powers wide enough to investigate
records for any -purpose was deleted by Congress. See 26 U.S.C.A. §1544 and
note (1935) ; also Rasquin v. Muccini, 72 F.2d 688 (2d Cir. 1934).
0See Mays v. Davis, 7 F. Supp. 596(W.D. Pa. 1934), First Nat'l Bank v.
United States, 160 F.2d 532(5th Cir. 1947), In re International Corporation Co.,
5 F. Supp. 608(S.D. N.Y. 1934).
"Federal Trade Comm'n v. Am. Tobacco Co., 264 U. S.298 (1924), Ellis
v. Interstate Commerce Comm'n, 237 U. S. 434 (1915). See note 44 infra.
""The court will not pass upon a Constitutional question although properly
presented by the record, if there is also present some other ground upon which
the case may be disposed of. The rule has found most varied application. Thus,
if a case can be decided on either of two grounds, one involving a constitutional
question, the other a question of statutory construction ... the court will decide
only the latter." J.Brandeis concurring in Ashwander v. T. V. A., 297 U. S.

288, 347 (1936).

436
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books and records. However, there would seem little need for any
examination beyond the ordinary limitation period on assessment.88
There are exceptions, of course, where no return has been filed or where
fraud is involved in the return 4 or where as much as twenty-five percent of the tax due has been omitted.8 5 In these cases the ordinary limitation on assessment is not applicable, and there may arise a need for
examination and production of records in order to determine a tax
deficiency. In view of the Congressional mandate against unnecessary80
examinations and the utter futility of examining records to "ascertain
the correctness of a return" at a time when there can be no further
assessment, the Commissioner should set forth in his complaint sufficient allegations8 7 to toll the ordinary statute of limitations on assessment. The allegation of reasonable suspicion of fraud 88 has been held
" IxT. Ray. CODE §275(a): "The amount of income taxes imposed by this
chapter shall be assessed within three years after the return was filed, and no
proceeding in court without assessment for the collection of such taxes shall
be begun after the expiration
of such period."
2 6
" INT. REv. CoDE § 7 (a) : "In the case of a false or fraudulent return with
intent to evade tax or of failure to file a return the tax may be assessed, or
a proceeding in court for the collection of such tax may be begun without assessment at any time."
" INT. REv. CoDE §275(c) : "If the taxpayer omits from gross income an
amount properly includible therein which is in excess of 25 per centum of the
amount of gross income stated in the return, the tax may be assessed, or a proceeding in court for collection of such tax may be begun without assessment,
at any time within 5 years after the return was filed."
" INT. REv. CoDE §3631: "No taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary
examinations or investigations, and only one inspection of a taxpayer's books of
account shall be made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer requests otherwise or unless the Commissioner, after investigation, notifies the taxpayer in
writing that an additional inspection is necessary."
This section has been construed as a limit on the power of the Commissioner.
Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942), First Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947). See also Pacific Mills v.
Kenefick, 99 F.2d 188 (lst Cir. 1938): "The first provision amounts to a
Congressional safeguard of the taxpayer's right not to be harrassed by unnecessary examinations. This right is stated in absolute terms. The other part of the
section is more explicit and limits the number of examinations to one per year
unless the Commissioner certifies that more are necessary,-a safeguard against
oppressive action by subordinate officials. Every presumption is to be made in
support of the Commissioner's action. But he clearly has no right to impose
additional examinations in disregard of the statute, i.e. unnecessary in the performance of his duty as Commissioner. A second examination ordered by the
Commissioner without any necessity therefor is an arbitrary abuse of power."
But cf. Bolich v. Rubel, 67 F.2d 894 (2d Cir. 1933).
A deficiency assessment is not illegal because facts forming the basis of assessment were obtained through alleged illegal second examination. Phillip Magone
Co. v. United States, 54 F.2d 168, 172 (Ct. Cms. 1931), Glassell v. Comm'r, 42
F.2d 653 (5th Cir. 1930).
"7Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 128 F. 2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942).
" In re Andrews, 18 F. Supp. 804, 806. 807 (D. Md. 1937), Martin v. Chandis
Securities Co., 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir 1942). Some showing of fraud is necessary
to justify examination; In re Brooklyn Pawnbrokers, Inc., 39 F. Snpp. 304 (E.
D. N.Y. 1941); Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 874 (3d Cir. 1936). But see
United States v. United Distillers Prod. Corp., 156 F.2d 872 (2d Cir. 1946).

1951]

NOTES AND COMMENTS

sufficient to warrant further examination, thus, not relegating the Commissioner to actual proof of fraud. The theory here is that examination
is allowed in order to ascertain whether fraud exists so that further
assessment can be made.
Where, however, there is no allegation of fraud or reasonable suspicion thereof, and the statutory period of assessment has run, courts
have held that a subpoena duces tecum compelling production of books
and records is an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the
Fourth Amendment. 39 It may well be argued that this is not a necessary
result. 40 If indeed, on the facts the courts feel constrained to disallow
further examination and production of records, the result can be reached
on statutory grounds. A fair interpretation of §3614(a) 4 . construed
in conjunction with §363142 leads to the conclusion that Congress intended to authorize examination and production of books only when
necessary and relevant to "income liable to tax." The assessment
period having passed, there exists neither the liability nor the necessity,
absent a tolling of the statute. Thus the courts' decisions under such
circumstances can rest on lack of power under the statutes rather than
on unreasonable search and seizure.
As a practical matter it would seem that where a taxpayer has
duly made his return and paid the tax, and the statutory time limit for
further assessment has passed, there should be no further required
examination by the Commissioner unless there is prima facie some good
reason therefor. 43 While the courts should not unduly circumscribe
the investigatory powers permitted the Commissioner in the performance of his highly important duties, such powers are not thus unduly
restricted. If "necessity" exists there can be no hardship in requiring
a showing thereof to the court.
As to the manner of asserting the defense, a taxpayer whose books
are demanded may refuse to comply with a blanket subpoena or "fishing excursion" 44 and when resort is had to the courts for enforcement,
See also In re Upham's Estate, 18 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. N.Y. 1937) ; In re Keegan,
18 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. N.Y. 1937) ; In re Paramount Jewelry Co., 80 F. Supp. 375
(S.D. N.Y. 1948).
"It re Andrews, 18 F. Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1937) (involved oral testimony
concerning books and papers) ; Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936).
A valid basis for decision in these cases is set out in, Martin v. Chandis Securities
Co., 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942).
4o See note 32 supra.
" See note 25 supra.
" See note 36 supra.
" Martin v. Chandis Securities Co., 33 F. Supp. 478, 480 (S.D. Cal. 1940)
cited with approval in First Nat'l Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir.
1947).
... as when the person served is required to fetch all his books at once to
an exploratory investigation whose purposes and limits can be determined only
as it proceeds." McMann v. Securities & Exchange Comm'n, 87 F.2d 377 (2d
Cir. 1937).
See also United States v. Union Trust Co., 13 F. Supp. 286 (W.D. Pa. 1936).
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he may then set up his objections. Similarly a third person so summoned may insist upon unreasonableness and lack of statutory power as
grounds for a court's refusal to enforce the Commissioner's order;
but neither may test the validity of an order by securing an injunction

to restrain its enforcement against himself."5 The courts have little
difficulty with the issues thus raised regardless of the theory on which
the decision is based.
Considerable -difficulty is experienced, however, when a taxpayer
attempts to restrain, or prevent by injunction4 6 or otherwise, 47 an
allegedly wrongful examination of a third party's books. In this instance
the taxpayer should not be afforded a remedy on any theory. He has no
proprietary interest in the records and therefore, there can be no search
and seizure which will be an invasion of his property rights. 48 Further,
there is no beyond-the-statute ground to give him relief. If the demands
made by the Commissioner are unlawful, and therefore unenforceable,
but the third party who might object has not done so, this is no more
open to objection by the taxpayer than a voluntary furnishing of information by any third party would be.

THoMAs H. SUDDARTH, JR.
'" Caplis V. Helvering, 4 F. Supp. 181 (E.D. N.Y. 1933); Zimmerman v.
Wilson, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1939) ; It re Keegan, 18 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. N.Y.
1937); In re Upham's Estate, 18 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. N.Y. 1937); Cooley v.
Bergen, 27 F.2d 930 (D.C. Mass. 1928). See 9 MERTEN, LAW OF FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION §49.171 n. 71 (ed. 1943).
"Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936) is an example of the
dilemma in which a court may find itself as a result of being too ready to decide
a constitutional question. Held: The taxpayers for whom the limitation period
on assessment had run, not the brokers whose records were being demanded, were
the real and aggrieved parties and that they might therefore enjoin what the
court called an unreasonable search protected by the Fourth Amendment. The

court, feeling that further examination would be an unreasonable search, bumped
squarely into the well established principle that only the owner of property may
object. (See note 48 infra.) It based its decision however, on the idea that the
taxpayers had some sort of property right in the information contained in the
broker's records. See Notes, 45 YALE L. J. 1523 (1936), 84 U. OF PA. L. Rv.
789 (1936), 84 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 904 (1936). The court, bothered by lack of
an allegation of fraud to toll the limitation on assessment, and feeling that further
examination should not be allowed, could have avoided the "property concept"
hurdle by a decision on statutory grounds. However, the embarrassment of the
decision was relieved somewhat when on remand, evidence was taken which
showed reasonable grounds to suspect fraud and the bill was dismissed. See 25
F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1938). This time on appeal the court retreated to the
sound position that only the owner of property may object. "Agents may not
under official pretext but in fact officiously, extend their powers beyond those
provided by law. If they attempt to examine unrelated transactions, or to
engage in an irrelevant "fishing expedition" . . . they may be restrained by the
court to whom application is made to enforce compliance." 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir.
1939). See Note, 28 GEo. L. J. 120 (1939).
""ln re Keegan, 18 F. Supp. 737 (S.D. N.Y. 1937), In re Upham's Estate,
18 F. Supp. 746 (S.D. N.Y. 1937).
"The principle is well established that only the owner of the books and papers
has a standing to object to a search as being an unreasonable search. Esgee Co.
v. United States, 262 U. S. 151, 158 (1923), Hale v. Henkel, 201 U. S. 43,
69 (1906), Simmons v. United States, 18 F.2d 85 (8th Cir. 1927), Graham v.
United States, 15 F.2d 740 (8th Cir. 1926).

